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The cocktail party planned at the Lima, Peru home of Japanese envoy Morihisa Aoki was 
not meant to be exceptional. The event, scheduled for December 17, 1996, was intended as a 
relaxed, pre-holiday celebration of Emperor Akihito’s 63"* birthday. The diplomatic officials of 
most embassies in Lima were invited for light cocktails and pre-Christmas conversation. No 
business was planned for the evening, and many of the officials in attendance brought their 
spouses, most of whom were well acquainted after years of circulating among similar gatherings. 
Approximately 600 people attended the party arriving throughout the early evening. A few 
minutes past seven o’clock, everything changed. Dressed as waiters bearing trays of champagne 
and hors d’oeuvres, about 20 guerrillas slipped in through the service entry. Within fifteen 
minutes, they set a series of explosions and took 376 diplomats and government officials hostage. 
Included amongst the hostages were the Japanese ambassador, the Bolivian ambassador, the 
Peruvian foreign minister, the minister of finance, the head of Peru’s national Anti-Terrorism 
Bureau, a Supreme Court Justice, several Congressmen, and the mother and brother of Peruvian 
president Alberto Fujimori.
The crisis would not reach an end until the afternoon of April 22, 126 days later. Three 
months of laborious negotiations would give way to a commando strike of 80 Peruvian soldiers 
and the deaths of all MRTA hostage-takers. The actions taken in this incident, by both the 
Peruvian and Japanese governments, led to unprecedented developments for each in the areas of 
diplomacy and crisis management. By global diplomatic scales, the crisis was handled fairly
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routinely. Within the context of contemporary political hostage incidents, the compromises 
achieved and lessons learned from this hostage event hardly demonstrated a new and innovative 
model of bilateral cooperation and strategic compromise. They did, however, signify major 
divergences by both nations from crisis management precedent. Peru and Japan both left 
traditional protocol to find a resolution to this crisis. In the end, both emerged altered by the 
experience and satisfied with the course of action.*
In order to understand the remarkable nature of this event, it is first necessary to grasp a 
working overview of similar incidents and procedure deemed effective through decades of 
increasingly common terrorism. An analysis of the crisis management protocols formerly 
utilized by both Peru and Japan, followed by a look at the unique circumstances brought forth by 
the hostage crisis at the Japanese embassy, reveal remarkable divergences from tradition for both 
in terms of diplomatic management. These nations which had before only negotiated on an 
economic level forged a unique bond in the course of their involvement. Peru and Japan, widely 
divergent in their diplomatic philosophies, found a new and acceptable middle ground while in 
pursuit of a resolution for a shared problem. Both nations sought to emerge from the hostage 
incident relatively unscathed. The terms of the most acceptable denouement was different for 
both. For Peru, this meant preserving the perception that terrorism had been eliminated, largely 
as a result of President Fujimori’s hard-line anti-insurgency tactics. For Japan, a low-cost escape 
meant finding a resolution which would not risk the loss of the human lives involved. In the 
pursuit of these seemingly opposing goals, a solution emerged which satisfied and proved 
beneficial to both parties. This project asserts that this crisis allowed both Peru and Japan to 
significantly expand their traditional crisis management tactics, each settling upon a formerly 
unacceptable position, maintaining it against the restrictions of precedent, and discovered that it 
was operable.
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POLITICAL HOSTAGE TAKING
The taking of hostages is a tactic that has been utilized by warring parties for centuries. 
Political hostage taking is defined specifically as the act of illegally holding one or more persons 
captive in order to make political demands.^ The earliest contemporary political kidnappings took 
place during Castro’s struggle in Cuba.^ These were staged almost entirely for the sake of 
publicity. No demands were made, the individuals were just held, then released unharmed. 
Eventually, realizing that taking hostages en masse was more effective than claiming them one 
by one, airplane hijackings began to take place. The first major modem publicity-oriented 
incident occurred elsewhere in Latin America - in Brazil. The U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, 
Charles Burke Elbrick, was kidnapped on September 4, 1969.'* In exchange for his release, the 
kidnapping groups (a coalition of two Brazilian leftist groups) demanded the immediate 
publication of it’s manifesto, the release of fifteen prisoners by the Brazilian government, and a 
flight out of the country. The government conceded, and the group’s demands were met.
This incident was soon replicated elsewhere in Latin America as similar kidnappings 
took place in Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic. In recent years, 
several major hostage incidents have occurred in the region.^ In 1974, Nicaragua’s Sandanista 
insurgents took hostages at a Christmas party. They succeeded in getting one of their comrades, 
Daniel Ortega, freed after seven years in jail. In Columbia, the M-19 rebels occupied the 
Dominican Republic’s embassy in 1980, holding 57 hostages and 19 diplomats, for 61 days.
That standoff ended peacefully after Cuban leader Fidel Castro mediated. However, five years 
later, the same guerrilla group took over the Palace of Justice in Bogota. When the army 
invaded, about 100 people died, including 12 supreme court justices. In a similar move in 1982,
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leftist activists seized the Spanish embassy in Guatemala, taking 23 hostages.^ An ensuing 
government attack led to much bloodshed. The MRTA attack upon the Japanese embassy was 
unexpected, but it was hardly out of context when one considers recent Latin American political 
activity.
As the trend of hostage-taking in order to reach political goals became more prevalent, 
academics and diplomats came to realize that they had entered into a self-perpetuating cycle. For 
the first decade of hostage incidents, governments dealing with them perceived them as 
aberrations. Events were handled in a manner which seemed to be mutually beneficial - lives 
were saved, even if that meant concession to the demands of the hostage takers. This, 
unfortunately, in effect encouraged more acts of terrorism and larger demands. Hostage-taking 
quickly came to be seen by many insurgent groups as a successful tactic: an effective way to 
publicize an otherwise unpopular or obscure cause, a means of gaining freedom for imprisoned 
comrades, or a road to quick riches. The willingness of governments and companies to meet 
these demands was taken as a sign of weakness, and thus an easy target for future incidents with 
greater demands. Each time a hostage situation ended with no deaths and the terrorist demands 
met, it encouraged other groups to do the same. In 1975, hostage incidents reached an all-time 
peak. By 1976, it became obvious that a policy-enforced movement towards a tougher stand was 
necessitated. Nations, led by Israel, the United States, and France, began to move towards 
establishing a protocol against terrorism, with rescue as the first option. To supplement this hard­
line stance, negotiations also became more difficult, demands were met less. This was obviously 
a risk for governments dealing with hostage-takers. The statistics of an outcome gained through 
forceful intervention do not bode well for those considering such drastic measures. A majority 
of hostage crises end peacefully and almost always the terrorists’ demands are not met.
However, in the past decade, 80 percent of hostages killed in such situations died during armed
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rescue attempts.^ By standing firm, lives were sure to be lost in the short-run, but, in the long 
run, hostage-takers would recognize the increased risk factors and the lessened likelihood that 
their demands would be met. This overall decrease in hostage incidents in the long run would 
save countless lives which would otherwise be jeopardized should governments continue to meet 
demands.
For many nations, the bittersweet lesson that a firm position was beneficial in the long 
run was translated into policy solutions. The United States, which plays a major role (by means 
of it’s military or it’s media) in most hostage situations, has a policy of absolutely no 
negotiations. Despite the US stance, the world has no uniform policy on responding to such 
events. A 1976 attempt to draft a United Nations treaty on hostage-taking failed after opposition 
by Arab governments. It would, they feared, impede the PLO and other anti-Israeli groups.*
One of the earliest examples of the new trend toward action in hostage events, along with 
the first recognition of the human cost that is risked by such a venture, occurred in 1974. 
Twenty-one Israeli schoolchildren were killed by Palestinian terrorists as Israeli forces moved in 
on a rescue raid. Since this disastrous operation, rescue measures have become much more 
prevalent, as well as dangerous. Successful attempts are few and far between. Prior to the Lima 
rescue, the most successful rescue occurred two decades ago, Israel’s 1976 rescue at Entebbe, 
Uganda, of hijacked air travelers.’ Framing these two successes are several tragic failures, 
perhaps the most notable the failed 1972 attempt to rescue captive Israeli Olympians in West 
Germany. For the US, the worst debacle came in 1980 in an attempt to rescue hostages held at 
the US embassy in Iran, which ended in a complete disaster when a helicopter and a transport 
plane collided and burst into flame. The sheer political cost of such a failed effort can be
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measured in the aftermath of this incident. President Carter never quite recovered from his role 
in the bungled mission, and soon after lost by a landslide to Ronald Reagan.
The majority of hostage incidents are initiated with the primary objective of the hostage- 
takers gaining publicity and media attention. Peripheral goals are usually freedom for comrades 
or monetary gain.'® In most incidents, regardless of which language is spoken by the hostage 
takers, press releases, instructions, or signs are printed in English. This reflects the realization 
that, without the attention of the international media, such efforts are futile, and English is the 
lingua franca of the world. The group of primary focus in a hostage incident is not the hostages 
themselves, but rather the global audience. This was well evidenced in the takeover of the 
Japanese embassy. Prior to and during the siege, the MRTA used publicity and media contacts 
as their primary weapons in the fight for political legitimacy." This would become a major 
factor in the logistical and political considerations which went into the negotiation process.
JAPAN
The development in Japanese policy towards crisis/hostage incidents through the Lima 
episode is best understood by considering the role and history of Japan in similar incidents and 
it’s role in contemporary Peruvian events. In the past half century, Japan has found itself to be a 
prime target for groups seeking monetary or political gain from the use of hostage situations.'^ 
Following World War II, formerly militaristic Japan was forced into a constitutionally mandated 
pacifist state. The military infrastructure was abolished, and research and development efforts 
were instead directed to technological and industrial gain into private spheres. Within forty 
years, this shift of resources paid off dramatically for Japan, as it took a leading role in the global 
export trade market.
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During the 1980’s, Japan became the world’s second largest economy, until growth 
tailed off in 1990 and the nation slumped into a recession.'^ Unable to maintain margins of 
growth of such magnitude, the Japanese domestic market experienced a 4% downturn between 
1990 and 1992. In the past four years, growth has been near zero.'^ Previous export efforts were 
increased, and foreign investment increased in order to compensate for slow growth in customary 
markets. Much of this growth has been into emerging Latin American markets. For reasons of 
both economic expansion and diplomatic obligation, Japan has traditionally offered assistance to 
developing nations to which it has or may potentially have political or business interests. The 
investments have reached staggering proportions, and usually are accompanied by requirements 
for trade policies or development concessions. In a February 1996 address to the Latin 
American Association of Japan, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Alexander F. 
Watson commended Japan for significant investment packages to South America and the 
Caribbean.'^ In 1995 alone, Japan contributed $65 million to El Salvador. In addition, between 
1990 and 1994, Japan contributed $72 million in bilateral aid to Haiti. Similar examples of a 
hemispheric effort to expand into growth-oriented Latin American markets are seen throughout 
the region.
In Peru more than any other Latin American market, Japan has found a comfortable and 
even profitable economic relationship. Since the late 19“’ century, tens of thousands of Japanese 
have emigrated to Peru.’^ Among these were President Alberto Fujimori’s parents, who came 
from Kumamoto in southern Japan in the 1930’s. Fujimori’s election in 1990 proved to be a 
catalyst in the relations between Lima and Tokyo. Fujimori, who was bom four months after his
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parents entered Peru,* is the first person of Japanese ancestry to be elected president outside of 
Japan. The bond between Fujimori and Japan was cemented long before his ascension to the 
presidency. Fujimori, who often labels himself as “100 percent Peruvian,” campaigned largely 
on his ability to attract Japanese capital, and he made a month-long official visit to Japan prior to 
his inauguration.'^ In a reciprocal visit in August 1996, Japanese President Hashimoto 
announced an aid package worth almost $600 million. Almost two dozen Japanese corporations, 
ranging from Mitsubishi to Matsushita, have opened new operations in Peru since Fujimori’s 
election. These investments, however, have come only with Fujimori’s promise to pursue 
neoliberal economic measures prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. Fujimori, who actually campaigned against these measures in 1990, ended up 
implementing the IMF’s austerity measures, his course shift caused mostly by the Japanese aid 
offers which were contingent upon his strict compliance with the harsh measures. The most 
significant lump sum contribution fi-om Japan, a $100 million international debt package, was 
delivered only after Fujimori provided sufficient proof of his ability to sustain the reforms.'*
These reforms, initiated by Fujimori and held in place largely through promises of 
Japanese investment, did more to incite the warring guerrilla factions in Peru than it did to pacify 
them. While good for investment stability and trade relations, Fujimori’s economic austerity 
plans were said to have made life worse for the poor. Over half of Peru’s 24 million people are 
in poverty, and few experienced the benefits of the programs.'’ This prompted the wrath of 
many Peruvians, especially guerrilla groups. The anger was directed toward a variety of Japanese 
corporations and diplomatic entities. The MRTA’s choice of occupying the Japanese embassy 
was highly symbolic on this account and was not an isolated event. Over the last six years, the 
Japanese embassy in Lima has been a target of four bomb attacks. In 1991, three Japanese aid
’ This has recently been a subject of intense debate in Peru, as his mother’s entry visa
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experts were killed by Maoist Shining Path guerrillas.^® Fujimori’s ethnic, as well as financial, 
connection to the Japanese government was a substantial component of Peru’s economic policy. 
By taking on something so close to his public identity, (not to mention the public pocketbook) 
the MRTA was sure to grab the unrivaled attention of the nation.
Japan’s enormous economic growth in the past decades has not been without some 
serious downsides, one of which is a growing number of hostage situations directed towards it’s 
citizens or representatives of it’s entities. The combination of extreme growth levels and far- 
reaching expansion into foreign markets has placed Japan increasingly as a preferred target for 
hostage incidents. Japan has a long history of kidnapping incidents involving diplomats and 
businessmen. It should be noted that in nearly every case, the desired demands were met.
Japan’s first such major incident took place in 1977, when Japanese Red Army guerrillas 
hijacked a Japan Air Lines jet bound for Dhaka. After five days of negotiation, Japan gave in to 
the hostage-takers demand of $6 million dollars and the release of 6 imprisoned Red Army 
members.^’ (Several are still at large) This incident set a precedent which has since haunted 
Japan, in both diplomatic and business relations. Koichi Oizumi, an international relations 
professor at Tokyo’s Nippon University, presented this as an event symbolic of the Japanese 
ideal of compromise reached through negotiation. In a 1991 interview with the Christian Science 
Monitor, he remarked, “Saying ‘We won’t yield’ is a Western idea. Japanese want a peaceful 
solution, one that puts respect for life first. This concept systematically reemerges in Japan’s 
approach to crises.”^^ In the same article, Japanese analysts asked about the concessions made to 
the terrorists acknowledged that paying ransom and acceding to other demands may have 
encouraged more hostage-taking and put more lives in jeopardy, but the focus in Japan remained 
on saving people currently at risk.
already lists a supposedly still-in-the-womb Alberto as a child.
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No formal policy addressing hostage incidents exists, but the absence of an all- 
encompassing stance on terrorism is indicative of Japan’s handling of hostage incidents. Rather 
than typecasting incidents and dealing with them by prescribed operational procedures, Japanese 
administrations and corporations have instead approached each incident as an individual 
scenario, separate from previous experiences and without future implications. In doing so, the 
emphasis is placed purely on resolving the situation at hand, usually through a negotiated 
agreement which results in a win-win resolution. Mitsuhiro Kagami, a Latin American specialist 
at the government-backed Institute for Developing Economies in Tokyo, stated that a “peaceful 
solution” often means a “financial solution” to hostage situations. Hostages are released, money 
changes hands, and Japanese hostages usually emerge unharmed.^^ This set of protocol, though 
developed mostly through demands made of government entities, also extends to hostage 
incidents in the private sector. For Japanese multi-nationals or corporations with foreign offices, 
dealing with hostages has become all too common in the past decades. Ransom payments, in 
effect, have come to be viewed as another cost of doing business. Most recently, Mamoru 
Konnu, president of Sanyo Video Component Corp. (U.S.) was kidnapped in Mexico and 
released nine days later, after the company paid a $2 million ransom. In the past five years 
alone, ten Japanese citizens have been kidnapped or murdered in Latin America.^'*
Because of limited levels political involvement, most kidnapper’s demands were ransom 
or extortion attempts focused on Japan’s economic wealth. This goal of monetary gain is apt to 
change as Japan, the world’s second largest economy, begins to play a more active role in global 
affairs. The current Hashimoto administration has put forth several bids to become a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council. So far, this effort has won only a temporary 
appointment as one of Asia’s two representatives.^^ This rise in recognized stature among
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nations, especially in dealings with undeveloped nations, translated into political power. Japan 
enjoys an increasingly powerful positions in most international economic or diplomatic groups. 
It is a primary lender in the IMF, and provides a large amount of aid to several nations. The 
growing number of hostage situations marks the risk of this movement overseas.
PERU
In the past two decades, Peru has been through political turmoil that might nearly be 
described as a state of civil war. An estimate by the New York Times^^ places the number of 
fatalities attributed to the fighting between soldiers and rebels at 35,000. Most of the dead were 
civilians. A large part of the social unrest was primarily rooted in economic depressions. In 
1980, inflation soared to nearly 60%. By 1983, almost overnight, inflation leapt to nearly 
200%.^^ Severe balance of payment problems, compounded by natural disasters, a growing drug 
trade, and an immense national debt, created what has been dubbed the worst economic crisis of 
Peruvian history. Real wages declined some 40 percent in five years, and 58 percent of the 
middle class sank into poverty.^* This marked only the beginning of a decade of fear and 
hunger. Between 1987 and 1989, the gross domestic product of Peru dropped by 28 percent, 
followed by another 60 percent drop in wages. By the end of the 1980’s, with a population of 22 
million, Peru was close to leading the world as a debtor nation.^’
These conditions provided the basis of dissatisfaction and grounds for rebellion that 
would culminate in the 1997 hostage crisis. During the early 1980’s, at the height of the 
economic crisis, two major revolutionary groups would form in Peru, the MRTA and the Sendero 
Luminoso. Only one of these groups, the MRTA, would be directly involved in the hostage
crisis. However, an understanding of the other group, the sheer terror that it conjured in Peruvian 
society, and the reaction that it elicited from the Peruvian government, is necessary in order to 
grasp a full comprehension of Peru’s absolutist positions against insurgent groups. Sendero 
Luminoso, or the Shining Path was a neo-Maoist terrorist group that employed horrific methods 
of violence while attempting to bring about the total dissolution of the Peruvian state.^° It 
opposed all forms of social or political structures, formal or informal. SL was equally as cruel to 
police officers and government officials as it was to neighborhood mothers starting up soup 
kitchens. The Shining Path declared complete war on Peru, and, in response to the Shining Path, 
the Peruvian government diverted a substantial amount of social funding into military accounts 
for counter-offensive measures. David Scott Palmer, who has studied the Shining Path 
extensively, estimates that the Shining Path cost the Peruvian government in excess of $25 
billion over eight years,^' and forced 600,000 citizens to seek refuge elsewhere.^^
Besides necessitating a new and substantial military expenditure, Sendero Luminoso 
also played a significant role in the formation and operating protocol of the official policy 
towards rebel groups. The government quickly adapted a zero-tolerance policy towards members 
of revolutionary. Beyond this, military counter-terrorism troops went on the offensive to root out 
and destroy any traces or suspicions of insurgency. Of the 30,000 dead in the warfare, human 
rights groups estimate that at least half could possibly be considered casualties of government 
strikes against suspected rebel villages.^^ Any suspected members were summarily executed or 
immediately imprisoned in hellish prisons, often without trial or notification of due cause. 
Independent human rights groups widely criticized the government methods, as they today 
continue to criticize the prison conditions and lack of judicial due process.^^ In 1992, the Shining 
Path’s dogmatic and worshipped leader, Abimael Guzman, was captured. This event, added to 
the intensified government crackdown on insurgents, allowed Fujimori to cultivate a tough, no-
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nonsense image based upon his absolute unwillingness to negotiate or tolerate any existence of 
insurgency. For nearly ten years prior to the siege upon the Japanese embassy, this was the 
essence of Peru’s no-negotiations, no-mercy policy against the actions of any armed group. For 
the most part, terrorism appeared to be on the wane. Into this scene would enter thirty young 
amaruistas balancing champagne trays and toting plastic explosives.
The MRTA
The Movimiento Resistancia de Tupac Amaru, or the MRTA, was named after an 18*** 
century indigenous rebel leader who fought colonial control.^^ With similar intent, the MRTA 
took up arms in 1984 to oppose the harsh economic conditions imposed by the government’s 
neoliberal austerity measures. Founded in the shantytowns surrounding Lima, the guiding 
principals of the MRTA align closely with many of the Communist principles that led the Cuban 
revolution. Originally, the MRTA aligned itself with the Sendero Luminosos, but within a year, it 
broke away. The MRTA leaned towards effecting change through public acts of resistance, 
utilizing newspapers, television cameras, and declarations. This was in sharp contrast to the 
Shining Path preference for snipers, grenades, and public executions. Following this break, the 
MRTA was named a target by both the Shining Path leadership and the Peruvian government.
The Shining Path considered the MRTA to be traitors to true Communism, and the government 
targeted them as anti-state rebels.
Unable to distinguish between the two groups, or, for that matter, between the rebels and 
innocent Peruvian citizens, the Peruvian military carried out a series of violent anti-insurgency 
campaigns. The MRTA was never as powerful or violent as the Shining Path, but the group still 
posed a significant threat to the Peruvian government. The primary tactics utilized by the 
MRTA were ambushing government troops, raiding police patrols, attacking Western embassies.
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robbing banks, kidnapping business executives, bombing American fast-food restaurants, and 
sabotaging government sponsored projects. Most of the MRTA’s revenue is derived from 
“taxes” paid by controlling territory in the upper Huallaga Valley.^ Besides basic philosophical 
differences, the MRTA and the Shining Path have often warred against each other for territorial 
rights in the drug trade. Despite this affiliation with the hemisphere’s largest coca producing 
region, the MRTA has enjoyed a “Robin Hood” image of stealing from the rich to help the poor. 
As a condition of releasing its kidnap victims, the group often required that food be distributed in 
shantytowns.
Total membership of the MRTA is currently estimated to be between 300 and 600 
members. An exact figure is unknown because the organization as a whole operates as a network 
small, well-armed, well-trained cadres of 20 or 30 people known only to one another.^^ Raids on 
single MRTA hideouts do little to break through the widely spread national organization. As 
recently as two years ago, officials in Peru believed the MRTA to be defeated. A 1992 raid 
captured and imprisoned seven of the MRTA’s highest commanders, including the group’s 
leader, Victor Polay.^ Polay is currently serving a life prison term, as is his lieutenant, Peter 
Cardenas. The group’s second-in-command, Miguel Rincon (known as Francisco), was captured 
in a raid twenty days prior to the hostage-taking at the Japanese embassy. After Polay’s capture, 
Nestor Serpa Cartolini became the leader of the MRTA. Under Cartolini, the MRTA 
experienced new levels of national and international attention. Cartolini, known in Peru by his 
nom de guerre Commandante Evaristo, was a founding member of the group and has always
* An area in eastern Peru where the majority of Peru’s $52 million/year cocaine crop is 
grown.
’ Polay, ironically, was a college roommate of former Peruvian President Alan Garcia in the 
early 1970’s.
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ranked high as a military commander. The mastermind behind many of the group s successful 
operations, Cartolini surfaced as the organizer and primary negotiator in the embassy incident.
Following a number of debilitating raids and several years in hiding, mostly due to 
Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori’s aggressive counterinsurgency campaign, the MRTA has 
switched gears, reassessed their plans, and tried to adapt to circumstances that were largely 
unfavorable due to the growth of the Peruvian military.^^ In the past three years, controlling 
territory and ambushing patrols gave way to “commando-style” missions intended to destabilize 
the government and attract media attention. Kidnapping and hostage-taking are major 
components of the new MRTA tactics. Following a November 30, 1996 raid on an MRTA Lima 
hideout, police investigators reported that they discovered detailed preparations for a hostage 
attack on the Peruvian congress.^* As evidence of the seriousness of the threat, police discovered 
a significant cache of weapons, diagrams of Congress, maps showing placements of guards, and 
replica uniforms for both police and military officers.
This raid should have raised a warning flag to Fujimori and other government officials 
that, despite their rhetoric to the contrary, armed insurgency groups within Peru were not totally 
defeated. Political violence had declined significantly since 1992, and Fujimori interpreted this 
as a sign of surrender on the part of the guerrillas. He began to tout his nation as being free of 
fear, the “subversive threat” locked safely away. In 1995, Fujimori re-allocated much of his 
estimated 20,000 specially trained counter-terrorist forces into dealing with an armed border 
conflict with Ecuador.” The military, lulled by the reassurances the government was sending 
out, began to relax it’s guard. Reports indicate that the police were aware of attempts by the 
MRTA to regroup in the last few months, but efforts to re-assemble the special forces came just 
two weeks before the embassy was taken.
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THE TAKING OF THE EMBASSY:
San Isidro, Lima, Peru; December 17, 1996 - April 24, 1997
The context for the attack, both historically and socially, is the most vital component of 
understanding the decisions made by Japan and Peru during the four month ordeal. Both nations 
came into the crisis with a unique background and well-defined, historically supported set of 
crisis management protocols. Japan had always negotiated, just as Peru had always refused to.
In the end, both nations broke their respective molds and took significant steps towards the 
other s style of diplomacy. The accumulated components of the hostage incident, from the initial 
response, through the consultation and negotiation process, concluding with public reaction 
(Peruvian and Japanese) to the attack, added up to make a large step away from tradition for 
those involved.
Following the initial explosion, set by the guerrillas posing as wait staff, the other rebels 
used dynamite to blow a hole in the retaining fence from an adjacent house they had been renting 
for months. Security had not been increased for the event, despite the fact that the Japanese 
ambassador had invited more than 600 international dignitaries. Once their way was cleared, the 
guerrillas stormed into the residence wearing gas masks and wielding numerous sorts of 
weapons. Inside, the thirty MRTA guerrillas made it quite evident that they had prepared 
impeccably for this event. According to Ambassador Anthony Vincent, of Canada, who would 
later play a major role as a mediator, the guerrillas interviewed their hostages carefully to 
identify them.^ Within a few hours, they let 100 women leave, as well as several elderly or 
physically ailing hostages. The MRTA group, led by Comandante Evaristo (a.k.a. Nestor Cerpa), 
clearly knew exactly what they were doing. Within five hours after the attack the embassy had
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been surrounded by police, and Nestor Cerpa calmly laid out his demands. (See Appendix #1)
He wanted the “liberation” of all 400 MRTA comrades held by the Peruvian government, a 
reversal of Fujimori’s “neoliberal” economic policies, and free-passage for the raid participants 
to a rebel stronghold in the Andes area of northern Peru. If the Peruvian government failed to 
meet his demands, Cerpa would begin killing hostages. Cerpa’s demands were almost 
simultaneously publicized by the MRTA spokesperson in Hamburg, Germany, Isaac Velazco, 
through a web page (http://bum.ucsd.edu/~ats/mrta.htm) and hundreds of faxed press releases. 
Just as the armed cadre had meticulously planned their assault on the embassy, they carefully laid 
out the components of the world-wide publicity blitz which would rocket their actions onto the 
world stage.
On the other side of the high embassy walls, the initial response of the Pemvians was 
shock. For nearly two years. President Fujimori and high military officials had largely 
proclaimed that insurgent factions within Pemvian society had been rooted out and annihilated. 
He boasted, even, that he’d annihilated both the SL and the MRTA so completely that only 
common criminals remained active.^' The circulation of these reports and their apparent 
credibility were large factors in the Japanese ambassador’s lax security on the night of the siege. 
Although the MRTA had been active as recently as a month prior to the attack, reports of this 
activity had not reached the press. In an interview with the New York Times, John Caro, former 
head of Pern’s anti-terrorism police,, gave as much credit for the success of the attack to the 
forgetfulness and laziness of the government anti-terrorist forces as he did to the genius of the 
MRTA strategists. In a classic example of closing the bam door after the horses had escaped, 
Fujimori immediately gave orders that the compound be surrounded by counter-terrorism forces. 
Most of whom could do little but stand on the fray and wonder what was happening inside the
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darkened embassy. Within two days, Peruvian stocks fell 4%, and tour cancellations ran at 30% 
of total bookings,^^
The immediate logistical problem of hostages aside, Fujimori immediately faced much 
greater problems. Technically, the Peruvian state did not have jurisdiction over the territory on 
which the Japanese embassy stood. By diplomatic convention, the property was officially 
Japanese, and any action on behalf of Peruvian forces which took place on the Japanese grounds 
necessitated clearance from the Japanese state. Inside the house were Peruvian citizens, which 
he had a responsibility to assist, but the number of Peruvians was slight compared to the number 
of foreign diplomats, businessmen, and citizens. Originating from 13 different countries, 
including Peru’s greatest economic investors, the United States and Japan, the situation was 
much more complicated than a standard MRTA incident. Similar attacks had been staged in the 
past, but never one with such far-reaching international implications and such immediate media 
coverage. If this had been a regular attack, the MRTA would have faced much higher chances of 
swift armed intervention. The precedent, set throughout a decade of guerrilla-state warfare, was 
that of zero tolerance. However, this position frequently resulted in death for hostage-taker and 
hostages alike, and often drew fire from international human rights groups. Within the Peruvian 
electorate, however, his hard-line stance was a significant contributor to Fujimori’s popularity 
and his reputation as a “tough-guy.”
The Japanese were well aware of Fujimori’s history with armed groups, as well as his 
history of military interventions. During the first minutes of the attack, a cellular phone call from 
a well trained diplomat alerted officials in Tokyo to the crisis. A half hour after the call. Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto sent a communique to Fujimori, urging him to wait for demands and 
possible negotiations. This would set the tone for the remainder of the negotiations. Japan knew
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well that the embassy was legally theirs, and that the ultimate resolution of the crisis should rest 
with Tokyo. Given his impulsive and violent history with similar groups, they repeatedly tried 
to make sure that Fujimori didn’t forget it.
Upon surveying the restrictions, the audience, and the risks, Fujimori had no choice but 
to abandon his traditional modus operandi and weigh the alternatives. By December 21, in a 
televised speech four days after the attack. President Fujimori reiterated his refusal to make 
concessions. The positions of the major players remained fixed - Fujimori said repeatedly that 
he would not give in to lawless criminals, and Hashimoto said he did not want to risk the lives of 
the 72 remaining captives by a sudden rescue attempt. He would, however, study a nonviolent 
“way out” if the guerrillas laid down their arms and freed all hostages. This position, which 
appears identical to his former refusal to negotiate, actually represented a significant divergence 
from tradition for the Fujimori administration. Fujimori never made an effort to pacify 
Sucmllas, rather, he focused on complete eradication of other insurgent elements within 
Peruvian society. Even by considering allowing them a way out, he breached his former 
absolutist position, and made possible what would become the longest hostage negotiation 
process in Latin American history.^^
Government negotiator Domingo Palmero entered the residence for the first time on 
December 26, beginning face-to-face negotiations with the MRTA. As promised, approximately 
twenty hostages were released. The Tupac Amarus, themselves masters of propaganda, 
recognized the value of maintaining good public relations and keeping themselves on the front 
page around the world. They did this through a constant trickle of hostage releases, signs, 
interviews, photo shoots, and use of the Internet. In doing so, they aimed to prevent the Fujimori 
administration from acting as gatekeepers to the press. Had he been able to do so, Fujimori
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could have effectively demonized their efforts, and successfully portrayed them as murderous 
terrorists rather than modern-day Robin Hoods. By making sure to control and feed information 
to the growing cadre of press corps outside the embassy compound, at one point totaling 700, the 
MRTA made sure of the “spin” put on this event. On days when the negotiations slowed, they 
hung a sign in the window and fired shots to re-focus attention. A sign seen more than once 
read: Peru: 13 million in extreme poverty - where is the progress?” Another indication of the 
international attention attained by the MRTA may be found on the Internet. Since the taking of
the Lima embassy, the MRTA home page has received 147,400 hits.^ Prior to 1996, it didn’t 
even have a home page.
In contrast with this, Fujimori said nothing. Reportedly, this was “necessary to protect 
the lives of the hostages during the negotiations.” For nearly a month after the initial siege, no 
reports or official statements were made regarding the crisis. This silence allowed the guerrillas 
to control the dialogue, and eventually added to Fujimori’s image problem. Sally Bowen, head 
of the Foreign Press Club in Peru, commented that “The government lost a major opportunity to 
get its point across to the foreign press.” Fujimori’s popularity ratings, already slumping in the 
past year due to a stagnated economy, sank from 75 percent to 45 percent the month after the 
hostage were taken.
The ongoing release of hostages did more than serve as good PR, it would also solve 
growing organizational problems surrounding the issues of guarding such a large number of 
captives. Over the next month, two to three hostages were released each day, keeping both the 
negotiators and the international media hopeful. By January 15, nearly a month after the attack, 
the rebels agreed to a negotiation commission, providing that everything, including freedom for
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jailed comrades, be on the negotiation table. Yet again, Fujimori abandoned his prior position of 
“no negotiations” and appeared ready to make some sort of a deal.
At this point, with negotiations between the government and the rebels set to begin, it 
became clear that Japan was not entirely comfortable with the directions taken by Peruvian 
forces. Despite the fact that Japan had been quietly urging Peru towards a “peaceful resolution” 
since the beginning, Peruvian forces were evidently forgetting that Japan was entitled to 
consultation.'*^ In keeping With their history, military troops outside the compound had 
reportedly engaged in exchanges of fire with the rebels. In the most serious incident, the rebels 
shot at a police car circling the compound after the police made obscene gestures in their 
direction. Soon thereafter, the troops and tanks outside the residence were doubled in an flagrant 
war of intimidation. Japan, wary of escalation and hoping to redirect attention onto the 
mediation process, called on President Fujimori to meet with Prime Minister Hashimoto in 
Toronto, Canada.^^
The nine-point communique (See Appendix #2) which resulted from the Toronto summit 
was headed by an agreement that Peru will now seek “the commencement of preliminary 
dialogues” with the MRTA. The other points embraced the positive intentions, especially ‘to 
achieve a peaceful resolution to this incident.” Behind the diplomatic niceties, Japan largely 
attempted to secure Fujimori’s guarantee that he would not act rashly, contrary to the process of 
negotiations. To assure that Japan’s role in the conflict was not to be forgotten, Japan’s Mexican 
ambassador was given an official role in the crisis team.
In a surprise move, Hashimoto, did not urge Fujimori to consider releasing he demanded 
MRTA prisoners, as he’d reportedly been planning to do. Instead, the Japanese leader asserted
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in his communique that he “supported President Fujimori in his rejection of the MRTA’s demand 
for the release of MRTA terrorists.” Just as Fujimori had diverted from standard protocol by 
agreeing to the Japanese requests of negotiation, the Japanese were reciprocating this effort by 
bending from their aversion to absolutist positioning. This summit, although widely accepted as 
posturing and hardly as media-worthy as the events at the compound, signified a turning point in 
the crisis. Fujimori, now bound by a legal obligation to diplomatic laws and a personal 
agreement to negotiate, was locked into a course of action he would hardly have considered 
otherwise. Japan, even with a long history of acceding to terrorists demands in order to extricate 
itself from similar situations, found itself edged precariously close to endorsing a militaristic end. 
By supporting Fujimori’s declared intent to not yield on the release of prisoners, which was the 
MRTA’s primary demand, Japan passed on using their influential position of nearly controlling 
interest over the Peruvian president to request a peaceful end. By not opposing his stubborn 
refusal to negotiate, Japan might as well have endorsed the obviously doomed negotiations and 
thus the eventual military solution.
Without any real concessions on the table for negotiations, the negotiations were 
laborious and often centered on minute details. Real progress was seldom accomplished, as the 
release of MRTA prisoners was never permitted for negotiation. Rebels would negotiate for a 
week, and periodically suffered break-downs over the rebels’ demand that their comrades be 
released from jail. At one point, Fujimori and the negotiators proposed a solution which would 
allow the raiders themselves safe transport from Peru to Cuba for asylum. In an effort to 
promote this solution, Fujimori traveled to Cuba and negotiated possible terms of transfer with 
Fidel Castro. Soon after, on March 12, talks were once again called off by the rebels amidst 
growing suspicions that the military forces were excavating tunnels beneath the home. Though 
denied by the Peruvian government, on site news media and diplomats confirmed the tunneling.
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At this point, with talks stalled altogether and progress at a standstill, Japan re-entered 
the negotiating arena. The Japanese foreign minister began talks in Peru, Cuba, and the 
Dominican Republic. Reports circulating indicated that this deal was in process: if the hostages 
agreed to the release the hostages and took asylum in Cuba, Peru would consider early parole for 
some jailed comrades. Fujimori, however, vehemently denied the possibility of any such 
agreement, meaningful talks once again halted, and rebels refused to allow even medical check­
ups for the hostages.^^
The end came on a Wednesday afternoon, in broad daylight. Most of the rebels were 
^XdiymgfiibaUto (minifootball) in the downstairs ballroom with a rolled up ball of carpet. Two 
teenage girls watching the remaining 72 hostages upstairs, most of whom were reading books, 
sleeping, or playing chess. In an explosion that shook the entire house, special force commandos 
detonated a large explosive immediately below the soccer game, killing five instantly. 
Immediately, other tunnels were blown open at points surrounding the house and compound. 
Approximately 140 commandos entered the residence from tunnels, all doors, and neighboring 
rooftops. Within five minutes, it was over with. One hostage, two soldiers, and all fourteen 
rebels were dead.^*
AFTERMATH
Japan, which had asked from the beginning to be notified prior to the attack, was left 
completely out of the loop. The attack came as a complete surprise to Prime Minister 
Hashimoto. In Tokyo, with dawn just barely brightening the sky, Hashimoto was awakened at 
5:23 a.m. to hear that his Peruvian embassy had been successfully stormed and retaken by 
commando troops. All 24 Japanese hostages survived. Japanese citizens, by now grown
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accustomed to the unchanging images of the embassy on the nightly news, awoke to dramatic 
footage of explosions, masked gunmen, and hostages frantically scrambling towards safety.
After speaking to freed ambassador Morihisa Aoki, Hashimoto appeared at a press conference. 
He told his nation, with a grim look upon his face, that he “regretted” he had not been notified by 
the Peruvian government in advance of it’s operation to free the hostages. In spite of this, he 
congratulated the Peruvian leadership on the success of the risky assault. In a telephone 
interview later that afternoon, he added that if he had been in Fujimori’s shoes, he might have 
done the same thing. Hashimoto, whose position prior to the raid demanded Peru’s acquisition 
of Japanese consent in advance of aggressive action, underwent a noticeable shift. In an 
interview with Tokyo Times, he added “It is not important whether we had prior knowledge of 
the move. The important thing is that the hostages were freed.” (See Appendix #3)
According to the Japan Times Weekly, April 25, 1997, the overwhelming public reaction 
was first one of disbelief, then joy as the news came that the hostages had been rescued.^’ For 
Japan, which has often been criticized for its historical hesitancy to take a stand against terrorists, 
the news that a situation involving Japan had ended violently came as a surprise. After two 
decades of concession, Japan at last had a taste of what it was like to not surrender to terrorist 
demands. Hisahiko Okazaki, a former Japanese diplomat, was quoted in the Weekly about this 
gradual shift towards public acceptance of the use of force. “No one openly supported the use of 
force (to resolve the Lima crisis), but somehow it was understood” that such a response might be 
necessary.^® This unexpected satisfaction extended from the public remarks of Prime Minister 
Hashimoto to former diplomats and public opinion polls. Even Morihisa Aoki, Japan’s 
ambassador to Lima and hostage for the entire 126 day duration, praised the way the crisis was 
resolved. Government spokesman Hiroshi Hashimoto told reporters that the rebels in the 
residence “deserved to be killed.” In the remainder of Mr. Okazaki’s comments, he expressed
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his belief that the acceptance of and positive reaction to the Lima crisis might be an indication 
that Japan is becoming more comfortable with taking a stronger, more assertive role in the world.
These statements and apparent reactions stand in sharp contrast to similar crisis events 
involving the Japanese. Even more out of place in modem Japan are the statements of 
spokesman Hashimoto, where official statements (such as the nine-point communique released 
two months prior) usually emphasized Japan’s pacifist role in international politics a benign 
respect for human rights. Whatever the actual catalyst was, Japan emerged from the Lima crisis 
with views greatly differing from those held at it s unforeseen entrance.
In Pern, public reactions to the embassy raid were mixed. On one hand, Pemvians 
rejoiced that the hostages had been freed. On the other hand, the problems which gave rise to the 
insurgent groups had not been addressed, and analysts quoted in the New York Times feel that 
this crisis may sigmfy a fresh round of guerrilla violence in Peru. The week aher the crisis, the 
Shining Path bombed three government offices in Lima, and TV reporters filmed another, 
heavily armed group of MRTA rebels in the Andean jungle. For the first time in Fujimori’s 
history in dealing with insurgent groups, he had allowed a process of negotiation as an option.
He did not follow it to completion, but the fact that he allowed the negotiation process to take 
place marked a significant difference from previous dealings with armed groups. The door was
opened.
CONCLUSION
The events which transpired during and as a result of the Lima embassy hostage taking 
altered the faces of Japanese and Peruvian political self-concept. It was a situation that neither 
could fully direct, and both found themselves in unfamiliar diplomatic territory due to the other’s
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maneuverings. For Peru, it brought the realization that the guerrilla warfare that had 
characterized the previous decade had not ceased, and that the military which had supposedly 
subdued it had actually just covered up the newest resurgence. Fujimori’s handling of the events 
leading up to the raid, his avoidance of the press corps, and dictatorial control of the situation 
reminded Peruvians of why they’d first sent Fujimori into the presidency, as did it also give them 
a realistic glimpse of his difficulties. Peruvians largely tolerated his authoritarian economic 
tactics as a result of the perception that he was winning the was on terrorism. The embassy raid 
by the MRTA destroyed this belief, as well as refocused public attention on his shortcomings. 
Peruvians, well-lulled by reassurances, and now were awake to the reality that Fujimori was not 
doing as well as he’d purported to be. Fujimori now faces the battle of bringing alienated 
factions back into a society where 4 of every 5 people lack a steady job.^^ Much confidence in 
his abilities and intentions has been lost, and he must bridge this gap in order to actualize an 
overall pacification of the country.
For Japan, the prevailing acceptance of and satisfaction with the military solution to the 
hostage crisis meant much more. The acceptance and approval of a forceful solution re­
introduced the Japanese to an option of military force. Since World War II and the 
“pacification” of Japan by U.S.-led forces, this has not been a viable option. While still lacking 
the necessary troops, the concept has entered popular and political consideration. The Japanese 
public, though not directly the aggressors in the rescue operation, followed the crisis like 
Americans watched the O.J. Simpson murder trial. Despite decades of pacifist solutions and 
little or no consideration of interventionary options, the Lima raid was a fresh ending to a 
familiar problem. More importantly, it will be the most recent model of a successful resolution 
to a hostage situation when the next hostage incident occurs. Japanese leaders will have to 
surpass the widespread approval of this incident’s resolution in the event of a similar crisis.
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The global implications of the Lima hostage incident extend even further. This incident, 
involving a number of nations and their accompanying policies on hostage negotiation 
procedures, is likely to become more frequent. International business ventures and multi­
national operations have put far more foreign citizens in target regions than ever before. Several 
nations, such as the United States, send diplomats through mandatory training for coping with 
hostage or attacks with intent to capture. Businesses with overseas offices have often sent 
executives through similar seminars. Japan has committed to doing the same. With the chance 
of similar events increasing, and more nations moving towards a policy of no negotiation, it is 
perhaps indicative that the development of an international protocol for dealing with hostage 
incidents is forthcoming.
The successful resolution to the Lima crisis will influence policy in another way, as well. 
For the next decade, this example will remain fresh in the minds of government and insurgent 
groups worldwide. As a result, I believe that governments will be less likely to concede to 
demands, and more likely to attempt a rescue. Hostage groups, similarly aware of the results, 
will be more prepared for such an advance. This will ultimately cause a shift in the nature of 
groups taking hostages. Groups that actually want demands to be met will take less hostages, as 
they will recognize that the odds of receiving concessions were lower. On the other hand, groups 
which are seeking publicity or media coverage for a specific group or issue will take notice of the 
attention given to the MRTA, and consider it as a workable option. The dramatic encore to the 
Lima incident predicates that the media reaction to the next such crisis will be immediate and 
extensive. As the world and it’s technology changes, so too do the types and objectives of 
terrorists.
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The solutions found and shifts undergone by Japanese and Peruvians does more than to 
delineate the clear differences between these nations. It exemplifies a situation which will 
become more prevalent in the future, as well as hints at dominant issues in the future of hostage 
crises. The Lima incident demonstrated the result of combining two nations, with sharply 
contrasting protocols and histories, in a diplomatic experiment of crisis management. Two 
approaches, mixed in the crucible of a shared experience, followed individual paths to a shared 
resolution. In the end, one emerged with a clearer view of itself, and the other began to see a 
side which had not existed for over fifty years. Neither emerged as it had entered.
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APPENDIX #1
Lima, 17th December, 1996 
COMMUNIQUE #1
The National Direction of the Revolutionary Movement Tiipac Amaru adresses our beloved peruvian 
peoples declare that today, Tueday, the 17th of December, at 8.25 p.m., the special force unit "EDGAR 
SANCHEZ" of our organization has miltitarily occupied the residence of the ambassador of Japan and has 
taken prisoners several personalities from politics, business and members of the diplomatic corps acredited 
in Peru.
We have given this operatiuon the name of "c. OSCAR TORRES CONDESU" with the slogan: 
"BREAKING THE SILENCE - THE PEOPLES WANT THEM FREE". This operation is under the 
command of MRTA-commander c. HEMIGIDO HUERTA LOAYZA.
We declare that from the moment of the military occupation of the residence of the ambassador of Japan in 
Peru, every measure has been taken to provide for the physical and moral integrity of the persons captured 
there. We have realized this military ocupation in protest against the interference of the Japanese 
government in the political life in our country, in every moment supporting the methods of violation of 
human rights applied by the government of Mr. Fujimori, as well as its economic policy which has brought 
nothing but increased misery and hunger to the majority of the people of Peru.
We also communicate to our peoples that we have been forced to take to this extreme measure in order to 
save the life of dozens of members and leaders of our organization, who suffer imprisonment under 
subhuman conditions and under a prison order which aims at their physical and mental annihilation. They 
are imprisoned in true "grave prisons", as Mr. Alberto Fujimori has repeatedly confirmed with the words 
"there they will rot and will only get out dead", which shows an irrational rage against social fighters who 
have risen in arms to fight for the well-being of our peoples.
In this sense, we state with the same emphasis with which we declare that we are respecting the physical 
integrity of the captured persons, that we will only free them if the government complies with the following 
demands:
That the government commits itself to change the economical course in favour of a model which aims at the 
well-being of the great majorities. That all prisoners belonging to the MRTA and every prisoner accused of 
belonging to our organization be set free. Transfer of the commando that entered the residence of the 
Japanese ambassador together with all the c. prisoners from the MRTA to the central jungle. As guarantee, 
some of the captured persons, who will be selected correspondingly, will also come along. They will be set 
free when we have reached our guerilla zone. Payment of a war-tax.
The MRTA has always been an organization disposed to answer proposals for dialogue, but it has only 
found repulsion and scorn from the government. Today we are in confrontation, and it must be clear that 
any military option which puts the life of the captured persons in danger will be at the absolute 
responsibility of the government, as well as any other action which we might have to take if the government 
does not respond to our demands.
WITH THE MASSES AND THE ARMS, PATRIA O MUERTE VENCEREMOS!
National Direction of the MRTA
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APPENDIX #2
Joint Press Statement of the Japan-Republic of Peru Summit 
1 February 1997, Toronto
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan and President Alberto Fujimori of the Republic of Peru met on 
1 February 1997 in Toronto, Canada, in accordance with an agreement between the Governments of Japan 
and Peru.
The purpose of this meeting was to hold a frank and serious exchange of views in order to achieve a 
peaceful resolution to the terrorist incident of the seizure of the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima 
perpetrated by the terrorist group calling itself the MRTA.
1. The two leaders strongly condemned the terrorist incident of the seizure of the Japanese Ambassador's 
residence in Peru as an act unacceptable to either government as well as to the entire international 
community, and reaffirmed their determination not to give in to terrorism.
2. The two leaders reaffirmed their intent to intensify their efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution to this 
incident, and to secure the full release of all the hostages at the earliest possible time, based upon the 
position of placing the highest priority on respect for human life.
3. The Toronto meeting reasserted the need for the closest collaboration and coordination between the 
Governments of Japan and the Republic of Peru in order to bring this incident to an end. In light of this, the 
two leaders agreed to promote the commencement of preliminary dialogs between the interlocutor of the 
Peruvian Government and the representative of the MRTA group currently inside the Japanese 
Ambassador's residence, in the hope that these dialogs would be realized as soon as possible.
4. The two leaders agreed that these dialogs should be conducted in a manner consistent with full respect for 
the legal system of Peruvian State, as well as for all the relevant and applicable principles of international 
law.
5. In accordance with the above-mentioned. Prime Minister Hashimoto supported President Fujimori in his 
rejection of the MRTA's demand for the release of the MRTA terrorists currently in incarceration, a 
position which was in agreement with the opinion of the entire international community.
6. The Japanese Government endorsed the position of the Peruvian Government that the preservation of the 
hostages' physical mental health was an indispensable element for the development of dialog aimed at a 
peaceful resolution.
7. The two leaders welcomed the fact that members of the Commission of Guarantors had met on 28 
January, and highly commended the continuing efforts by the Commission of Guarantors to realize the 
earliest possible direct dialog between the interlocutor of the Peruvian Government and the MRTA group 
inside the Japanese Ambassador's residence. It was agreed that in the meetings of the Commission of 
Guarantors, Ambassador Terusuke Terada would be present as the official observer from the Government 
of Japan.
8. Prime Minister Hashimoto reaffirmed his full confidence in the Peruvian Government's handling of this 
incident, and asserted that his Government would continue to give its full support to the effort to achieve the 
shared objective of the release of all of the hostages.
9. The two leaders expressed their deepest appreciation for all the cooperation provided by the Government 
of Canada for the realization of this meeting.
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APPENDIX #3
Comment to the Press by Prime Minister Hashimoto 
on His Telephone Conversation with President Fujimori
Peru, Lima 
March 27, 1997
At 9 a.m. this morning, I telephoned President Fujimori and had serious discussions for 50 minutes. I 
expressed my gratitude to him for the fact that he spent long hours with Mr. Komura during his visit to Peru 
as my special envoy and for the tremendous efforts the President made toward finding a solution for the past 
100 days.
Bearing in mind that the President himself had mentioned the other day that Samana Santa should be the 
period of reflection, I told the President to reflect in the real sense during this period and to set a course to 
bring about the peaceful solution as promptly as possible.
In essence that is what I told the President. I would like to add that our conversations were very serious. 
However, I should stop here and avoid going into detail, because we are going through a very sensitive 
period. In particular, the President asked me not to go beyond saying that we had serious conversations, 
because the news in Japan is picked up and carried by the Peruvian mass media immediately.
Naturally, the members of the Committee of Guarantors are making efforts even while Arch Bishop Cipriani 
isout of town right now, but we may not see any substantial developments until the Arch Bishop comes back 
to Lima presumably on Monday. This is why I am hoping that the best option will emerge from our 
reflections over these next several days.
Thank you.
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APPENDIX #4
Press Conference by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto 
on the Situation at the Japanese Ambassador's Residence in the 
Republic of Peru
23 April 1997 07; 15 - 07:22 (Tokyo time)
Press Conference Room at the Official Residence of the Prime Minister
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto: Special forces of the Peruvian military stormed the Japanese 
Ambassador's Residence in the Republic of Peru at 3:23 p.m. yesterday Peru time.
The Cabinet immediately called for a meeting of the Headquarters and gathered information while keeping 
a close watch on the developments of the situation at the Ambassador's Residence. At 6:43 this morning 
Japan time Ambassador Aoki was able to speak directly with me on the phone after being rescued. All of 
the Japanese hostages were safely rescued, and a few of them have sustained light injuries. However, none 
of those are serious. Right now we are in the process of confirming everyone, one-by-one, and determining 
the degree of their injuries.
Unfortunately, Japan was not informed prior to the initiation of this rescue operation.
While I must say that it is regrettable that Japan did not learn of the action in advance, I would like once 
again to express my gratitude to President Alberto Fujimori and the other members of the Government of 
Peru who seized the opportunity and carried out this remarkable rescue operation.
Among the media reports that have come out, there are some reports that some of the Peruvian military 
personnel involved have been killed and wounded. My heart grieves for the dead and wounded and for their 
bereaved families.
Ambassador Aoki, and Mrs. Aoki, whom I also spoke with on the phone, were in extremely good spirits. It 
seems that Ambassador Aoki has a slight injury to his elbow, but he sounded great and told me that "It is 
just a slight scratch."
The Ambassador said that he intends personally to visit all of the hospitals where the injured are. At any 
rate, efforts to confirm the safety of all involved have already begun.
The Government of Japan has decided to dispatch Foreign Minister Ikeda to Lima today in order to take any 
measures which will be necessary following what has happened.
If the situation is as it seems to be, there probably is no need for the medical team which we prepared in 
advance. Still, considering that those hostages who were held for such a long time may be prone to fatigue 
after they are relieved, I have given instructions that preparations be made to dispatch the medical team as 
well. Also, I have instructed the Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission and the Director- 
General of the National Police Agency to prepare to send their staff members to Lima to investigate and 
confirm everything that has occurred since the incident broke out.
I have given you a report on the situation as it is and I am glad to be able to share with you the joyous news
that the hostages are all right. Furthermore, although the reports are still not confirmed, if it is true that some
of the members of the Peruvian military who participated in this rescue operation have been killed or
injured, then I would like to express my heartfelt condolences and prayers that their injuries are light ones.
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We will be reporting on the situation to the countries who have been so generous with assistance during this 
incident and to thank them. I would like to express my deep gratitude to the many individuals who, in this 
extremely difficult situation, showed their goodwill and gave us their cooperation. That is all that I have to 
tell you now.
Q. Earlier just now you said that there was no prior notification. How did you learn of the storming by the 
Peruvian military forces.
Prime Minister Hashimoto: As of 5:30 a.m., I had not yet heard, but I received a phone call immediately 
after the reports of the storming came through.
Q. Who called you?
Prime Minister Hashimoto: I received calls fi-om several of my assistants and fi-om the Headquarters. I will 
take only one more question.
Q. You stated that you hoped to see a peaceful solution. However, in fact the military forces stormed the 
residence. What are your thoughts on that?
Prime Minister Hashimoto: We truly hoped that this situation would end without incident and not through a 
forced storming of the Residence. Still, those were the thoughts of people in a location separated by 14 time 
zones fi’om those who were there watching the situation. It is natural that there was a difference. I wonder if 
there is anyone who could criticize President Fujimori for the use of force now that the hostages have been 
safely rescued, whether or not there was prior notification.
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APPENDIX #5
I.Hostage crisis in the Republic of Peru. Briefing given by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hiroshi 
Hashimoto:
At 15:23 Peru time, on 22 April, a special unit of the
Peruvian Armed Forces stormed the Japanese Ambassador's Residence, bringing an end to the four 
month-long occupation of the residence by the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto has already held two press conferences on this incident this morning.
Through these press conferences, I am sure that you have already learned of the developments which 
have occurred and of Japan's position on this incident. For the record, I will go through these one more 
time for your benefit. I understand that one official of the Peruvian Supreme Court who was being held 
hostage and two members of the special forces were killed. I express my sincere condolences to these 
victims and their bereaved families.
We have been able to confirm that the 71 hostages, including 24 Japanese nationals, were successfully 
rescued. Although some of them are reported to have injuries such as bums and bmises, no one has 
been seriously harmed. The Government of Japan highly appreciates the miraculous way that this 
operation was handled without yielding to terrorism.
Prime Minister Hashimoto spoke for 20 minutes on the telephone with President Alberto Fujimori of the 
Republic of Pern this morning. Prime Minister Hashimoto expressed his gratitude to President Fujimori 
and the other members of the Pemvian Government who seized the opportunity to implement this 
difficult operation successfully. Although he regretted that there had been no prior notification on this 
rescue operation. Prime Minister Hashimoto expressed his understanding of the situations leading up to 
President Fujimori's decision given the subtle timing of the strategy. President Fujimori asked Prime 
Minister Hashimoto to convey a message to the people of Japan that he regretted the long time it took 
to solve this incident, but that Peru had been able to bring this incident to closure without giving in to 
terrorism, and he expressed his appreciation for the trust which the people of Japan had shown him and 
his Government.
Minister for Foreign Affairs Yukihiko Ikeda will depart for Lima at around 20:00 this evening. Foreign 
Minister Ikeda will be taking with him a team of National Police Agency investigators and medical 
specialists.
I would like to take this opportunity to express the respect of the Government of Japan for the 
tremendous patience and endurance with which the hostages passed this ordeal. We intend to do all that 
we can to help all of the hostages to recover and return to their normal lives.
In the days to come, the Government of Japan will be reporting on the situation and thanking all of the 
countries which have been so gracious with various forms of assistance during this ordeal. We are truly 
appreciative of the continued support and solidarity shown by the international community. Here again, I 
must express my heartfelt gratitude to the many people who cooperated so much during the last four 
months.
11. Prior notification
Q: Regarding what Prime Minister Hashimoto said about prior notification, throughout this crisis, Japan, 
and you yourself, have said that prior notification would be necessary for any armed resolution to this 
problem. What is your feeling now on the lack of prior notification?
Spokesman Hashimoto: President Fujimori repeatedly told us and the public that the Peruvian
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Government would not take military action so long as the MRTA would not injure the hostages. In 
general, we expected that if that happened and President Fujimori had to decide to take actions, he 
would notify Prime Minister Hashimoto of these actions. As Prime Minister Hashimoto said, we 
regretted that this was not done, but at the same time, we understand the situation. As Prime Minister 
Hashimoto said in the press conference today, we understand the difficult situation, and President 
Fujimori, as supreme commander, had decided to take advantage of this opportunity. We are very 
grateful that this incident is over. Unfortunately, three people were killed.
Q: This excludes the kidnappers, because more than three people were killed.
Spokesman Hashimoto: As far as the MRTA is concerned, they deserve to be killed.
Q: So, the Japanese Government never at any time gave its blessing, so to speak, to President Fujimori 
to conduct an operation of this kind should the need arise? Was there any discussion that he could make 
this decision on his own if it was deemed necessary?
Spokesman Hashimoto: President Fujimori expressed his regrets to Prime Minister Hashimoto over the 
telephone today that he could not give notification regarding these actions. Now that this incident has 
been brought to a successful end, we should understand that President Fujimori made decisions on his 
own regarding the timing, the actions, etc., and it was miraculous that only very limited numbers of 
people were killed during this operation.
Q: What if there was no notification and it did not turn out in such a favorable way?
Spokesman Hashimoto: Probably, we should think about the successful result which we, of course, 
wanted. One official of the Supreme Court was killed, I am sure that his family is very saddened over 
this incident. However, other than this loss the incident was resolved very peacefully. Knowing this, we 
say that although we regret that we were not told before the move, we are able to understand this 
situation very well.
Q: There was a newspaper report that Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Fujimori had exchanged 
documents, or signed some kind of agreement, in Toronto that Peru would notify Japan before taking 
military action. Does such a document exist, or is the agreement verbal? If this is a very formal 
agreement, do you consider the Peruvian action in violation of this?
Spokesman Hashimoto: In Toronto, there was no paper signed between Prime Minister Hashimoto and 
President Fujimori. The two Governments issued a joint press statement in Toronto. On the basis of this, 
the two gentlemen went to their press conferences. At that time. President Fujimori clearly stated that he 
would not use force unless the hostages were threatened or injured by the MRTA. Prime Minister 
Hashimoto supported what President Fujimori said and he clearly warned the MRTA not to make any 
threats against the hostages. Of course, I must tell you that the Government of Japan, in general, wanted 
to bring this incident to an end peacefully. In general terms, we expected that prior notification would be 
given if President Fujimori were to take military action; this was not the case. However, Prime Minister 
Hashimoto expressed his understanding of the situation where President Fujimori could not provide 
prior notification. We are very appreciative that this difficult operation brought a successful end to the 
four month-long hostage incident.
Q: When Prime Minister Hashimoto says that he understands the circumstances of not notifying the 
Japanese Government, what does he mean by "circumstances"? What circumstances does he 
understand?
Spokesman Hashimoto: He understood the timing of taking the action. He understood why President 
Fujimori could not notify Japan of the actions before the actual operation. Prime Minister Hashimoto 
understood the difficult situation under which President Fujimori acted.
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III. Timing of the storming of the Japanese Ambassador's Residence 
Q: What is your understanding of the timing of this incident?
Spokesman Hashimoto: The headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not aware at all that 
this kind of military action would take place today. However, in general terms, we expected that 
President Fujimori might take military action if the MRTA did something wrong in regard to the 
hostages. In light of this, we prepared ourselves for what we should do in the case that military action 
was taken. However, we simply were not aware of any signs that force was going to be used.
Q: Is there any indication that the hostages were threatened with violence and that is what prompted 
President Fujimori to begin military action?
Spokesman Hashimoto: So far, what we know about the operation is very limited. Ambassador 
Morihisa Aoki said in his press conference that he personally did not know very much about the 
operation itself I think it will take some time for us to be fully informed of the process of the operation.
IV. Japanese Ambassador to the Republic of Peru
Q: This afternoon. Ambassador Aoki said that for him to continue in his job depends on the attitude of 
the Japanese Government. Do you have any comment on that?
Spokesman Hashimoto: First of all, we are very appreciative that he has carried out his responsibility 
very successfully. For the time being, we must take care of the people who have been injured. Foreign 
Minister Ikeda is flying to Lima. There are many things to do before we ceui say anything in regard to 
your question. In any case, we are happy that we have that kind of responsible, calm and confident 
ambassador.
V. Police investigations at the Japanese Ambassador's Residence
Q: In this morning's press conference. Prime Minister Hashimoto said that President Fujimori asked for 
the ambassador's residence to be closed for two days. What is the Japanese response to this?
Spokesman Hashimoto: We have given our consent to this. With the cooperation of a team of national 
police in Lima, I think that the Japanese Ambassador's Residence will be closed for two days.
However, together with Foreign Minister Ikeda, another team of National Police Agency investigators 
will fly to Lima. So, with the cooperation of the Peruvian police, I think that the necessary investigations 
can be carried out in Lima.
VI. Japan-Republic of Peru discussions on hostage crisis responses 
Q: Were you consulted on the nature of the military response?
Spokesman Hashimoto: Not if you are talking about a concrete plan. However, our team in Lima 
consulted various people, for example, the police which were engaged in first aid, etc., on what we 
should do in the event of a crisis. This was carried out on the basis that some kind of crisis might 
happen, which does not mean that the Peruvian Government was contemplating taking action in 
cooperation with Japan.
VII. Protection of Japanese embassies
Q: Will the experience of the last four months change the way the Japanese embassies are protected in 
countries around the world?
Spokesman Hashimoto: When we found out that the MRTA had seized the residence, we started to
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investigate and study what we should leam from this incident. Also, under the Foreign Minister, a small 
committee was established and has already been operating regarding how to more effectively protect 
our overseas establishments. In addition to this, this morning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established 
another committee of investigations. We must study many things regarding this incident, e.g., why it 
happened, what we should leam from the incident, what sort of protection we should provide, etc.
IX. Death of MRTA members at the Japanese Ambassador's Residence
Q: The report said that 14 members of the MRTA are dead. Is there any report as to how they were 
killed? And, what is the reaction of the Japanese Government on the fact that 14 members are now 
dead?
Spokesman Hashimoto: We are not aware of the details of the operation itself Therefore, I cannot tell 
you how they were killed. I have already told you that they deserved to be killed.
X. Negotiations during the hostage crisis
Q: Do you have any opinion on why the negotiation process was unsuccessful in this case?
Spokesman Hashimoto: Again, we must review why Archbishop Cipriani's mediating efforts could not 
bear a tangible result. We very much appreciated that he enthusiastically mediated between the Pemvian 
Government and the MRTA. However, from the very start of the incident. President Fujimori stated that 
he would not allow any MRTA members in prison to be released. At the same time, we knew that the 
MRTA strongly demanded the Government to release MRTA members. So, \\4iat Archbishop Cipriani, 
together with other members of the Commission of Guarantors, could do was very limited. However, 
Archbishop Cipriani was extremely sincere in dealing with this incident. Unfortunately, the MRTA 
demands for release of prisoners did not change up until the last moment.
Q; You mentioned that this was a successful mission, although perhaps the Japanese Government was 
not ready for it. Do you think that the Japanese Government will perhaps change its policy in dealing 
with terrorists in future hostage situations should they arise?
Spokesman Hashimoto: Japan is a member of the G-7 countries or P-8 countries, which have been 
denouncing terrorism. In this incident, that principle has been adhered to with gratitude to the actions 
taken by President Fujimori. I believe that our policy will continue as such in the future.
XI. Other hostage situations in Japanese history
Q: Can you think of any other incidents in recent times where a hostage situation involving Japanese was 
resolved by use of force?
Spokesman Hashimoto: No, I do not recall any incidents. This was the first time that Japanese 
Government officials together with other civilians and foreign dignitaries were taken hostage. So, many 
things are very new to us. In the past, the Japanese Embassy was seized by terrorists, but this was a 
long time ago. I cannot give you precise information on how we solved this incident. But, for a long 
time, a hostage incident of this kind has not taken place. This is a new experience for us. In the last four 
months, we have learned quite a lot from this incident. So, I am sure that we can take more appropriate 
actions if any similar incident takes place in the future. Of course, we do not want this to luqjpen.
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